PC/WI: The Soviet Unión making a separate peace with an anti-nazi German government after Tehran

[Juan de Mariana]

When talking about the possibilities of a new German government arising from an anti-nazi coup in 1943-1944, it is usually held that after Tehran neither the Western Allies nor the Soviets would have agreed to a separate peace or a peace without unconditional surrender. But I think one can argue that even after Tehran, had such a coup taken place, the Soviets would have agreed to a separate peace. Let me explain why.

There is a number of sources showing Stalin's mistrust of his Allies, and pointing to his fear of his Allies making a separate peace with Germany and leaving the Soviet Union in the lurch to fight Germany alone, or even joining forces with Germany against the Soviet Unión. According to some of these sources, in the last years of the war his fear was that even if his Allies would not make peace with Hitler, they would make it with a non-nazi goverment, or even that they could be actively plotting with elements in Germany to overthrow the nazi government and make peace with a new, obedient government. And these sources (some, it is true, more trusteorthy than others) imply that this fear continued after Tehran and almost to the end of the war.

My point is that, if Stalin and the Soviets really believed this, and a coup had taken place in Germany between Tehran and the Normandy landings, then it would have been logical (in their mind) to try to preempt such a peace making themselves a separate peace with the new Germán government. But I may be wrong, and so I wanted to discuss these ideas here. What do you think? And how would such a peace have looked like?

 

[Nell_Lucifer]

It would certainly be awkward for the W-Allies...

Obviously by this point in time the German war situation was already bad, so any kind of peace accepted by the Soviets will have to be very conceding to them. Perhaps 1939 borders? Access to docking rights in East Prussia?

I don't see Stalin weakening the Germans too much or at all if he could get palpable evidence they will not stab him in the back, they are still at war with the W-Allies, France is still occupied...

 

[Juan de Mariana]

I think the peace could be made on these lines:
- Germany's frontiers in the East to be those of 1938 (with Austria and the Sudetenland but without the Polish corridor).
- The borders of the Soviet Union like IOTL after the war (excepto for Kaliningrad, which remains Konigsberg).
- Germany recognises Poland, Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, and perhaps Hungary and Slovakia, within their prewar borders, as part of the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. The Soviets have a free hand there. But the Germans are allowed to use the Romanian oil fields as long as the war lasts.
- Germany also gives a free hand to the Soviet Union in the Turkish straits and regarding Turkey in general.
- Not sure what happens with Danzig and Memel here.

What do you think?

 

[Gillan1220]

Hmm I don't see the Soviets accepting the Germans' offer of peace here. By 1943-1944, the Red Army was all out in expelling the Germans from the USSR and was pushing into the Fatherland.

For the sake of the scenario, maybe we would have a three-way Cold War between the Western Allies, the Reich, and the Soviet Union. In the Pacific, the U.S. would continue its war against Japan until the Empire capitulates.

 

[Juan de Mariana]

Hmm I don't see the Soviets accepting the Germans' offer of peace here. By 1943-1944, the Red Army was all out in expelling the Germans from the USSR and was pushing into the Fatherland.

That's what most people think, but, as I said before, I think they have not taken into consideration Stalin's mistrust of his Allies, what he feared and believed they would do.

 

[Bored Young Man]

IOTL all of the coups attempts with institutional power in Nazi Germany were either delusional or army-types that wanted to peace the western allies to focus on the true enemy in the east-who would even entertain this? Coups require lots of people in key places and what evidence did Stalin have of that?

Also given Stalin's paranoia and vindictiveness why would he sign Molotov-Ribbentrop 2.0 as he believed and was was winning? 1943 was when Stalin switched from berating the W-Allies for being too slow to-take your time, we got this.

 

[Gillan1220]

IOTL all of the coups attempts with institutional power in Nazi Germany were either delusional or army-types that wanted to peace the western allies to focus on the true enemy in the east-who would even entertain this? Coups require lots of people in key places and what evidence did Stalin have of that?

Also given Stalin's paranoia and vindictiveness why would he sign Molotov-Ribbentrop 2.0 as he believed and was was winning? 1943 was when Stalin switched from berating the W-Allies for being too slow to-take your time, we got this.

Other than his paranoia, that is.

Stalin did pressure the allies to open fronts in North Africa, Italy, and Western Europe to ease the burden on the Eastern Front. Once those fronts started, at least the Red Army could be slightly relieved.

 

[Bored Young Man]

Other than his paranoia, that is.

Its quite a leap of logic to go from suspicious allies to clearly enemies out to destroy the USSR who are still at war with Nazi Germany and giving us lend-lease. At the very least you'd see Stalin put out feelers and slow down operational tempo only for his generals and his own instinct to press for attacks least the Nazis recover. This also requires the Nazis to give up land in the East and become Notzis that don't deem the conquest of the USSR as the end goal. Who are these Notzis in key positions of power in the Nazi government?

Stalin did pressure the allies to open fronts in North Africa, Italy, and Western Europe to ease the burden on the Eastern Front. Once those fronts started, at least the Red Army could be slightly relieved.

Even without the Soviets, who in Germany trusts the USSR so close to Romania-and how would Germany outspend oil, tech, and resources to win against Allied airpower? Where's Germany going to get the rubber, oil, and food in such a peace? Are the Soviets going to export oil and food to the genocidal maniacs so they can recover and promise not to do round two? If not than what German leader would willingly choose guarenteed starvation and defeat?

 

[Juan de Mariana]

IOTL all of the coups attempts with institutional power in Nazi Germany were either delusional or army-types that wanted to peace the western allies to focus on the true enemy in the east-who would even entertain this?

By the end of 1943 most anti-nazi conspirators were ready for an agreement with the Soviets if necessary. For example Ulrich von Hassell, who would have been Foreign Minister had the coup succeded, wrote in his diary in August 1943: "If Hitler comes to terms with Stalin, the resultant disaster cannot be imagined. It would be different with a decent, self-respecting Germany. This Germany would have to exploit all oportunities. There is only one expedient left - to make either Russia or the Anglo-Americans understand their interest in a sound Germany. Actually a healthy European heart is in the interest of the East as well as the West. In this Mühlespiel I prefer the Western orientation, but if need be I would also considera an agreement with Russia. Trott agrees with me entirely; the others are doubtful for theoretical and moral reasons, which I understand, but they are gradually coming around".

Coups require lots of people in key places and what evidence did Stalin have of that?

Of course nobody is asking Stalin to come to an agreement with the opposition before a coup takes place. But once the coup has taken place and there is a new government in Germany, Stalin would have plenty of evidence of the coup.

Also given Stalin's paranoia and vindictiveness why would he sign Molotov-Ribbentrop 2.0 as he believed and was was winning? 1943 was when Stalin switched from berating the W-Allies for being too slow to-take your time, we got this.

To preempt his Allies doing the same. Of course the Western Allies were committed by the to unconditional surrender and would never have agreed to a separate peace, but what matters here is what Stalin believes they would do, and there are reasons to think he believed the Allies would make peace with a non-nazi goverment.

This also requires the Nazis to give up land in the East and become Notzis that don't deem the conquest of the USSR as the end goal. Who are these Notzis in key positions of power in the Nazi government?

If there is a coup against Hitler and a non-nazi goverment is formed, of course there won't be any Nazis in the government.

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

Not likely. If Stalin promised the coup plotters anything, he is 0% likely to honor that agreement. Stalin's intention behind the M-R Pact seems to have been to create time for Hitler to gobble up the rest of Europe while Stalin built up his forces and eventually attacked from behind, gobbling up liberating everything Hitler had conquered. A good idea, only ruined by the fact that Hitler bucked schedule and hit him while he was still making the final preparations for the attack, meaning that he was put on the back foot very early on and only managed to get half of Europe by war's end.

IOTL the Soviets rolled an inordinately high number of L's in the opening stages of the war, so I find it difficult to believe that they could start from a much worse position. Which means it's also harder to imagine that they'd be in a precarious enough position for this to be possible. Unless the Germans are still somehow east of the Dnieper in June 1944, Stalin isn't likely to say "We're at risk of being outnumbered, we need to stop." He'd say "We need to drive straight for the Rhine before the Americans can get there, and fuck the extra casualties!"

 

[Juan de Mariana]

IOTL the Soviets rolled an inordinately high number of L's in the opening stages of the war, so I find it difficult to believe that they could start from a much worse position. Which means it's also harder to imagine that they'd be in a precarious enough position for this to be possible. Unless the Germans are still somehow east of the Dnieper in June 1944, Stalin isn't likely to say "We're at risk of being outnumbered, we need to stop." He'd say "We need to drive straight for the Rhine before the Americans can get there, and fuck the extra casualties!"

I don't understand your point. ITTL it is not the fear of casualties which would make Stalin sign a separate peace with the new German government, but the belief that his allies would make one with it at his expense if he does not.

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

I don't understand your point. ITTL it is not the fear of casualties which would make Stalin sign a separate peace with the new German government, but the belief that his allies would make one with it at his expense if he does not.

I meant that he would consider the push westward to be the #1 priority and extra casualties would not be a concern. Convincing him that the WAllies are planning to leave the fight isn't going to make him go for peace, it's just going to make him scramble to defeat Germany as fast as possible.

In July of 1944(1), the WAllies were holding down about 800k German troops, compared to 2.5m German troops on the Eastern Front.
By contrast, the Soviets had around 6.8m troops. They had already pushed the Germans out of Soviet territory and would be making sweeping breakthroughs from October to February. While I'm sure the war would be longer if the Soviets were facing an additional 800k men, the broad sweep of the war was no longer in doubt.

(1)

 

[Garrison]

I would like to know where these anti-Nazis came from, because they are markedly short supply inside the Wehrmacht. The people who tried to assassinate Hitler were the same ones who executed the Hunger Plan and were motivated by personal survival, not any opposition to Nazi ideology.

 

[Crueldwarf]

Not likely. If Stalin promised the coup plotters anything, he is 0% likely to honor that agreement. Stalin's intention behind the M-R Pact seems to have been to create time for Hitler to gobble up the rest of Europe while Stalin built up his forces and eventually attacked from behind, gobbling up liberating everything Hitler had conquered. A good idea, only ruined by the fact that Hitler bucked schedule and hit him while he was still making the final preparations for the attack, meaning that he was put on the back foot very early on and only managed to get half of Europe by war's end.

There is literally zero indications that it was Stalin's plan. Even if simply because literally no one was expecting that Germany will roll up France easily and dominate most of continental Europe by the autumn of 1940.

And of course wanting to fight Germany controlling the Europe was an utter madness. United European front against Bolshevism was a biggest nightmare of the Soviet leadership, so they would never do anything that they believed could bring such a front into existence.

So no, all these theories about Stalin wanting to backstab Hitler at any point is just re-iteration of old Nazi bullshit about their attack being pre-emptive strike. Literally nothing in the Soviet war planning and military deployments suggests that they were in preparation stages to attack Germany in 1941 or even 1942 or 43.

 

[Juan de Mariana]

I meant that he would consider the push westward to be the #1 priority and extra casualties would not be a concern. Convincing him that the WAllies are planning to leave the fight isn't going to make him go for peace, it's just going to make him scramble to defeat Germany as fast as possible.

In July of 1944(1), the WAllies were holding down about 800k German troops, compared to 2.5m German troops on the Eastern Front.
By contrast, the Soviets had around 6.8m troops. They had already pushed the Germans out of Soviet territory and would be making sweeping breakthroughs from October to February. While I'm sure the war would be longer if the Soviets were facing an additional 800k men, the broad sweep of the war was no longer in doubt.

(1)

But the Western Allies making peace with Germany would have meant an end of lend-lease, and the opening of the world markets for Germany. On the other hand, the coup needs not happen on July 20, 1944, it can take place earlier.

 

[Juan de Mariana]

I would like to know where these anti-Nazis came from, because they are markedly short supply inside the Wehrmacht. The people who tried to assassinate Hitler were the same ones who executed the Hunger Plan and were motivated by personal survival, not any opposition to Nazi ideology.

The people who tried to assasinate Hitler came from many backgrounds and cannot be all put in the same bag. Certainly there were some who fit your description, but by no means all of them. That description does not fit Beck, Gordeler, Hassell, Leuschner, Leber, Bolz, Witzleben and many others.

 

[Garrison]

The people who tried to assasinate Hitler came from many backgrounds and cannot be all put in the same bag. Certainly there were some who fit your description, but by no means all of them. That description does not fit Beck, Gordeler, Hassell, Leuschner, Leber, Bolz, Witzleben and many others.

Oh please. There were a few people who had opposed the Nazis from the beginning but the notion that Beck was anything except a self-serving careerist is nonsense. Valkyrie was about saving their own skins, not principled operation. Any regime that succeeds Hitler's is not going to be anti-Nazi and will still be full of men who have committed war crimes, unless you subscribe to the clean Wehrmacht myth.

 

[marktaha]

Didn't the Russians once offer peace.on the basis of Germany's 1937 frontiers?

 

[Sacer Bubonicus]

There is literally zero indications that it was Stalin's plan. Even if simply because literally no one was expecting that Germany will roll up France easily and dominate most of continental Europe by the autumn of 1940.

They might not have expected France to fall so soon, but they would have been aware of the fact that Germany had a great advantage over the French and British and was going to win at some point. The busier Hitler was in the west, the easier it would be to plow his ass into the sea.

And of course wanting to fight Germany controlling the Europe was an utter madness.

Actually it's quite sound. Germany would be stuck holding down its conquests, many of which had large left-wing resistance movements that would conduct sabotage and would surely rise up once a Soviet invasion of Germany started. Not every place would be like Yugoslavia, but they could definitely be counted on to hinder Germany in the event that the Soviets invaded.

United European front against Bolshevism was a biggest nightmare of the Soviet leadership, so they would never do anything that they believed could bring such a front into existence.

Like invade Poland and the Baltics after WW1? They weren't worried about such a front then! That sounds like something Hitler could take to the rest of Europe and say "See? He's planning to go for Round 2! I am your only hope!" But instead Hitler and Stalin made a non-aggression pact that let Hitler turn on the rest of Europe confident that the Soviets wouldn't stop him.

Edit: and given Hitler's own recent record of aggression, it would be very difficult for him to convince everyone that he is the lesser of two evils, especially since he bordered more of them than the Soviets do.

all these theories about Stalin wanting to backstab Hitler at any point is just re-iteration of old Nazi bullshit about their attack being pre-emptive strike. Literally nothing in the Soviet war planning and military deployments suggests that they were in preparation stages to attack Germany in 1941 or even 1942 or 43.

First, what makes you think they didn't know their next-greatest enemy was Germany? If the German rhetoric about lebensraum and Judeo-Bolshevism can be taken at face value as a measure of their intentions, why can't we take Soviet rhetoric about world revolution and capitalism as a measure of their intentions? Make no mistake, both of them 100% intended to break the pact eventually in order to obtain their ideological goals. They just had different ideas of when was the right time to do so. It was never a good faith effort on either side's part.

Second, the Soviets did make preparations for an eventual war. Here's a video that might interest you. It talks about Suvorov's claims and compares them to the far better sourced claims of Mikhail Meltyukhov. There's also a wikipedia article on Meltyukhov's book that provides additional details.

 

[Garrison]

They might not have expected France to fall so soon, but they would have been aware of the fact that Germany had a great advantage over the French and British and was going to win at some point. The busier Hitler was in the west, the easier it would be to plow his ass into the sea.

Honestly no one thought the Germans had an advantage, not even the Germans, because in terms of numbers of men and equipment the Germans were badly overmatched. It was only some dreadful decision making on the part of the Allies and some serious luck for the Germans that allowed Sickle Cut to work as it did. It was far more reasonable to expect a long drawn out war of attrition in the west and if you look at where Germany invested most of its military production before the war and in the run up to the Battle of France it was heavily weighted towards the weapons needed to fight a WWI style static battle, with tanks being some way down the priority list.